Arab Academy
for Science Technology & Maritime Transport

The International Maritime
Transport and Logistics Conference
"Marlog 11"

50 Years Of Excellence

"Cyber-Physical Security for Ports Infrastructure"

11 Marlog 2022

Towards a SUSTAINABLE BLUE ECONOMY

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Hilton Green Plaza Hotel

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CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR PORTS INFRASTRUCTURE: INTRODUCTION

Aims:

- Major attributes of cyber-physical security in ports will be presented.
- Security threats and vulnerabilities faced by ports' infrastructure will be discussed.
- An overview of the major initiatives by the industry and governmental entities will be presented.
- An overview of some security assessment methodologies for the evaluation of cyber-physical security threats and vulnerabilities will be provided.
- Conclusions derived will be discussed.

DEFINITIONS



"Cyber-physical systems pertain to the integration of IT and OT systems along with human factors"

→ ***IT systems**: "..used to manage complex data and information flow." :*

- Transaction Processing Systems.
- Office Automation Systems.
- Knowledge Management Systems.
- Management Information Systems.
- Decision Support Systems.
- Executive Support System.

→ ***OT systems**: "… control the physical world."*

- Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
- Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA)
- Distributed Control Systems (DCS)
- Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

→ ***Human factors**: "… operate the IT/OT systems."*

- Operators
- Maritime operations stakeholders
- Service providers
- Maintenance providers

STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRY - OPERATIONS

- Multiple stakeholders
- Multiple interconnections
- Worldwide connections
- Interdisciplinary connections (legal, financial, engineering, services, operational, 3rd party consultancy, insurance, governmental, etc)



STAKEHOLDERS IN MARITIME (AND CYBER) SECURITY: ISPS APPLICATION



CYBER-PHYSICAL ASPECTS IN PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

Examples of maritime IT/OT systems and networks

Shore facilities:

- Transfer and load out racks
- Terminal automation systems
- Crane control systems
- IP cameras
- VOIP/ROIP communications
- Physical security access controls
- Life safety systems
- Environmental control systems
- Warehouse management
- Tank management systems
- Utilities

Vessel:

- Tension monitoring
- Ship-to-shore comms/ESD
- Vessel propulsion
- Navigation
- AIS, GPS
- Ballast control systems
- Dynamic Positioning Systems (DSP)
- Engine monitoring
- IoT
- Custody transfer systems

SECURITY ADVERSARIES AGAINST PORT INFRASTRUCTURE



CYBER PHYSICAL THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES IN IT/OT SYSTEMS

Threats

- Lack of network segmentation
- DDoS attacks
- Web apps attacks
- Malware
- Manipulation of systems commands and parameters and procedures

Vulnerabilities

- Legacy software
- Default configuration
- Lack of encryption
- Remote access policies
- Policies and procedures
- Cybersecurity knowledge in the workforce

EXAMPLES OF MARITIME CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS

- Multiple ports South Africa (2021)
- Port of Houston, USA (2021)
- Shahid Rajaee Port, Iran (2020)
- Toll Group, Australia (2020)
- Mediterranean Shipping Company (2020)
- Deep draft vessel, NYC USA (2018)
- Port of San Diego, USA (2018)
- Port of Barcelona, USA (2018)
- COSCO Shipping, USA (2018)
- MAERSK, global (2017)



CURRENT STATUS - INDUSTRY

Industry

- *Standards, Recommended Practices, Codes, Guides and Resolutions*

IMO

- ISPS Code (2002)
- Guidance MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3
- Resolution MSC.428(98)

NIST

- NIST CSF
- SP 800-30
- SP 800-37
- SP 800-82
- SP 1500-201
- SP 1500-202
- SP 1500-203

ISO/IEC

- ISO/IEC 27001
- IEC 62443 series
- ISO/IEC 21827
- ISO/IEC 18045
- ISO/IEC 15408-1
- ISO/IEC 27032

ASTM

- Standard F3286-17
- Standard F3449-20

CURRENT STATUS - GOVERNMENT

Government

- *Legislation, Policies, Directives, Regulations, guidance documents*

USA

- US Congress issued Bill S. 4023
- USCG NVIC 01-20
- USCG CVC-WI-027

UK

- IET/DSTL/DFT/NCSC Good Practice Guide in Cybersecurity for Ports and Port Systems (2020)
- IET/DSTL/DFT/NCSC Code of Practice for Cybersecurity for Ships (2017)

EU

- European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan (2018)
- EU Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR)
- EU directive 2016/1148/EU
- EU Cybersecurity Act (2019/881/EU)
- EU cybersecurity strategy JOIN/2013/01
- ENISA guidance reports

SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND CYBER PHYSICAL SECURITY



API SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT (SRA) – API STD 780

"Security risks should be managed in a risk-based, performance-oriented management process to ensure the security of assets and the protection of the public, the environment, workers, and the continuity of the business."

1. Analyze assets and criticality.
   Screen Assets on consequence.
   Identify Critical Assets.
2. Analyze threats and asset attractiveness.
   Determine target assets.
3. Conduct scenario analysis.
   Determine act-specific consequences and vulnerability.
4. Assess risk against security criteria.
5. Evaluate security upgrades as required.
   Determine residual risk.

CYBER SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND PSM (PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT)

Qualitative

- Check Lists
- PHA (Process Hazards Analysis)
- What-If Reviews
- HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) Review
- Bow-Tie Analysis (Barrier Analysis)

Quantitative

- ETA (Event Tree Analysis)
- FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)
- FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis)

Quantitative and Qualitative process safety review can define risks, hazards and consequences of security incidents in maritime systems, equipment, processes and operations.



Source: ABS with information elaborated by authors.

BOW TIE ANALYSIS (BTA)

Utilize bow-tie analysis for the identification of security barriers and measures for assets in the micro- and macro- scales .



WHY USING BOW-TIE ANALYSIS?

"By linking 'Hazards' & 'Consequences' to an 'Event' it is possible to develop the relationship to include the causes, or 'Threats', and the 'Prevention' & 'Recovery Measures'" (ABS)

→ Simple & pragmatic approach
→ Emphasis on effectiveness of risk reduction measures
→ Effective visualization
→ Allows better communication of hazards
→ Can be applied for all types of hazards
→ Increasingly becoming the preferred techniques by regulatory bodies & leading companies
→ Efficiently aided by user-friendly software

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

Source: SANS Institute with information elaborated by authors.

Port ICS Security Bow Tie Analysis

MITRE ATT&CK THREAT MODEL



The Enterprise ATT&CK Matrix



ATT&CK Object Model Relationships

CONCLUSIONS

(1) More industry and government directives and standards need to be developed specifically for ports infrastructure and the maritime transport sector.

(2) The physical protection of assets, processes and IT and OT components in ports infrastructure needs to be enhanced.

(3) The assessment of IT/OT vulnerabilities in ports needs to be improved.

(4) The port industry needs to adopt security assessment methods from other industry sectors.

(5) Cybersecurity training of port infrastructure stakeholders needs to be widely pursued.

(6) The convergence of cyber and physical security for the ports infrastructure and vessels should be pursued.

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Thank you

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