



Arab Academy
for Science Technology & Maritime Transport

The International Maritime
Transport and Logistics Conference

“Marlog 11”

“Cyber-Physical Security for Ports Infrastructure”

Prof. Nikitas Nikitakos
Iosif Progoulakis (PhDc)
Prof. Dimitrios Dalaklis
CAPT. Razali Yaacob



UNIVERSITY OF
THE AEGEAN



Towards a
SUSTAINABLE **BLUE**
ECONOMY

20 - 22 March, 2022
Hilton Green Plaza Hotel


CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR PORTS INFRASTRUCTURE: INTRODUCTION

Aims:

- Major attributes of cyber-physical security in ports will be presented.
- Security threats and vulnerabilities faced by ports' infrastructure will be discussed.
- An overview of the major initiatives by the industry and governmental entities will be presented.
- An overview of some security assessment methodologies for the evaluation of cyber-physical security threats and vulnerabilities will be provided.
- Conclusions derived will be discussed.



DEFINITIONS



“Cyber-physical systems pertain to the integration of IT and OT systems along with human factors”

→ IT systems: “..used to manage complex data and information flow.” :

- Transaction Processing Systems.
- Office Automation Systems.
- Knowledge Management Systems.
- Management Information Systems.
- Decision Support Systems.
- Executive Support System.

→ OT systems: “... control the physical world.”


- Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
- Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA)
- Distributed Control Systems (DCS)
- Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

→ Human factors: “... operate the IT/OT systems.”


- Operators
- Maritime operations stakeholders
- Service providers
- Maintenance providers

STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRY - OPERATIONS

- Multiple stakeholders
- Multiple interconnections
- Worldwide connections
- Interdisciplinary connections (legal, financial, engineering, services, operational, 3rd party consultancy, insurance, governmental, etc)



STAKEHOLDERS IN MARITIME (AND CYBER) SECURITY: ISPS APPLICATION



CYBER-PHYSICAL ASPECTS IN PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

Examples of maritime IT/OT systems and networks


Shore facilities:

- Transfer and load out racks
- Terminal automation systems
- Crane control systems
- IP cameras
- VOIP/ROIP communications
- Physical security access controls
- Life safety systems
- Environmental control systems
- Warehouse management
- Tank management systems
- Utilities

Vessel:

- Tension monitoring
- Ship-to-shore comms/ESD
- Vessel propulsion
- Navigation
- AIS, GPS
- Ballast control systems
- Dynamic Positioning Systems (DSP)
- Engine monitoring
- IoT
- Custody transfer systems

SECURITY ADVERSARIES AGAINST PORT INFRASTRUCTURE



CYBER PHYSICAL THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES IN IT/OT SYSTEMS

Threats

- Lack of network segmentation
- DDoS attacks
- Web apps attacks
- Malware
- Manipulation of systems commands and parameters and procedures

Vulnerabilities

- Legacy software
- Default configuration
- Lack of encryption
- Remote access policies
- Policies and procedures
- Cybersecurity knowledge in the workforce



EXAMPLES OF MARITIME CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS

- Multiple ports South Africa (2021)
- Port of Houston, USA (2021)
- Shahid Rajaei Port, Iran (2020)
- Toll Group, Australia (2020)
- Mediterranean Shipping Company (2020)
- Deep draft vessel, NYC USA (2018)
- Port of San Diego, USA (2018)
- Port of Barcelona, USA (2018)
- COSCO Shipping, USA (2018)
- MAERSK, global (2017)



CURRENT STATUS - INDUSTRY

Industry

- *Standards, Recommended Practices, Codes, Guides and Resolutions*

IMO

ISPS Code (2002)

Guidance MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3

Resolution MSC.428(98)

NIST

NIST CSF

SP 800-30

SP 800-37

SP 800-82

SP 1500-201

SP 1500-202

SP 1500-203

ISO/IEC

ISO/IEC 27001

IEC 62443 series

ISO/IEC 21827

ISO/IEC 18045

ISO/IEC 15408-1

ISO/IEC 27032

ASTM

Standard F3286-17

Standard F3449-20



CURRENT STATUS - GOVERNMENT

Government

- *Legislation, Policies, Directives, Regulations, guidance documents*

USA

US Congress issued
Bill S. 4023

USCG NVIC 01-20

USCG CVC-WI-027

UK

IET/DSTL/DFT/NCSC Good Practice
Guide in Cybersecurity for Ports and
Port Systems (2020)

IET/DSTL/DFT/NCSC Code of Practice for
Cybersecurity for Ships (2017)

EU

European Union Maritime Security
Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan (2018)

EU Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR)


EU directive 2016/1148/EU

EU Cybersecurity Act (2019/881/EU)

EU cybersecurity strategy
JOIN/2013/01

ENISA guidance reports

SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND CYBER PHYSICAL SECURITY



API SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT (SRA) – API STD 780

“Security risks should be managed in a risk-based, performance-oriented management process to ensure the security of assets and the protection of the public, the environment, workers, and the continuity of the business.”



CYBER SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND PSM (PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT)

Qualitative

Check Lists

PHA (Process Hazards Analysis)

What-If Reviews

HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) Review

Bow-Tie Analysis (Barrier Analysis)


Quantitative

ETA (Event Tree Analysis)

FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)

FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis)


Quantitative and Qualitative process safety review can define risks, hazards and consequences of security incidents in maritime systems, equipment, processes and operations.



Source: ABS with information elaborated by authors.

BOW TIE ANALYSIS (BTA)

Utilize bow-tie analysis for the identification of security barriers and measures for assets in the micro- and macro- scales .



WHY USING BOW-TIE ANALYSIS?

“By linking ‘Hazards’ & ‘Consequences’ to an ‘Event’ it is possible to develop the relationship to include the causes, or ‘Threats’, and the ‘Prevention’ & ‘Recovery Measures’” (ABS)


- Simple & pragmatic approach
- Emphasis on effectiveness of risk reduction measures
- Effective visualization
- Allows better communication of hazards
- Can be applied for all types of hazards
- Increasingly becoming the preferred techniques by regulatory bodies & leading companies
- Efficiently aided by user-friendly software



WHY USING BOW-TIE ANALYSIS?

“By linking ‘Hazards’ & ‘Consequences’ to an ‘Event’ it is possible to develop the relationship to include the causes, or ‘Threats’, and the ‘Prevention’ & ‘Recovery Measures’” (ABS)

- Simple & pragmatic approach
- Emphasis on effectiveness of risk reduction measures
- Effective visualization
- Allows better communication of hazards
- Can be applied for all types of hazards
- Increasingly becoming the preferred techniques by regulatory bodies & leading companies
- Efficiently aided by user-friendly software




Source: SANS Institute with information elaborated by authors.

Port ICS Security Bow Tie Analysis

MITRE ATT&CK THREAT MODEL

Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 10 techniques	Persistence 18 techniques	Privilege Escalation 12 techniques	Defense Evasion 34 techniques	Credential Access 14 techniques	Discovery 23 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 16 techniques	Command and Control 14 techniques	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact 13 techniques
Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts	Command and Scripting Interpreter Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Native API Scheduled Task/Job Shared Module Software Deployment Tools System Services User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation	Account Manipulation BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Create or Modify System Process Event Triggered Execution Group Policy Modification Hijack Execution Flow Hijack Execution Flow Process Injection Scheduled Task/Job Valid Accounts	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Access Token Manipulation BITS Jobs Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Direct Volume Access Exception Guards Exploitation for Defense Evasion Event Triggered Execution File and Directory Permissions Modification Group Policy Modification Hijack Execution Flow Hijack Execution Flow Process Injection Scheduled Task/Job Valid Accounts	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Access Token Manipulation BITS Jobs Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Direct Volume Access Exception Guards Exploitation for Defense Evasion Event Triggered Execution File and Directory Permissions Modification Group Policy Modification Hijack Execution Flow Hijack Execution Flow Process Injection Scheduled Task/Job Valid Accounts	Brute Force Credentials from Password Stores Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Input Capture Man-in-the-Middle Modify Authentication Process Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Unsecured Credentials	Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connectome Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connectome Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery	Archive Collected Data Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Man in the Middle Screen Capture Video Capture	Application Layer Protocol Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Dynamic Resolution Encrypted Channel Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application-Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Web Service	Automated Exfiltration Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration Over Web Service Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Defacement Disk Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot




The Enterprise ATT&CK Matrix

ATT&CK Object Model Relationships

CONCLUSIONS

- (1) More industry and government directives and standards need to be developed specifically for ports infrastructure and the maritime transport sector.
- (2) The physical protection of assets, processes and IT and OT components in ports infrastructure needs to be enhanced.
- (3) The assessment of IT/OT vulnerabilities in ports needs to be improved.
- (4) The port industry needs to adopt security assessment methods from other industry sectors.
- (5) Cybersecurity training of port infrastructure stakeholders needs to be widely pursued.
- (6) The convergence of cyber and physical security for the ports infrastructure and vessels should be pursued.



“Marlog 11”

Thank you

شكرا لك

Prof. Nikitas Nikitakos - nnik@aegean.gr

(University of the Aegean, Chios, Hellas – Greece)

Iosif Progoulakis (PhDc) - iprogoulakis@aegean.gr

(University of the Aegean, Chios, Hellas – Greece)

Prof. Dimitrios Dalaklis

(WMU, Sweden)

CAPT. Razali Yaacob

(Netherland Maritime Institute of Technology, Malaysia)



UNIVERSITY OF
THE AEGEAN

